Volume 54
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 54,
1949-1950
10-1-1949

The Attorney's Lien in Pennsylvania
Marcellus H. McLaughlin Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Marcellus H. McLaughlin Jr., The Attorney's Lien in Pennsylvania, 54 DICK. L. REV. 62 (1949).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol54/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

THE ATTORNEY'S LIEN IN PENNSYLVANIA
Attorneys in Pennsylvania haw long been concerned with the difficulty of
collecting compensation for their services. These difficulties more or less arise
from the fact that there has been no one decision in Pennsylvania clearly setting
forth the various rights accruing for the collection of compensation.
An example of the difficulties that may confront an attorney in his collection
of fees due, as well as expenses incurred, is illustrated in the Purman case. (In re
Purman, 358 Pa. 187, 175 A.L.R. 1129, 56 A.2d 86, 1948). Here, a decedent
devised his entire estate to his daughter and son, to the complete exclusion of his
widow. The widow petitioned to take against the will. As a result of this petition,
friction arose between the widow and her daughter. The daughter orally employed
an attorney by the name of Montgomery to represent her in a suit arising out of
an alleged mortgage indebtedness, and by written agreement also employed an attorney by the name of Harrison to represent her in other matters concerning the
personal estate. Pending these proceedings the widow and daughter adjusted their
differences, which permitted the fiduciary to file an account of its administration.
At the audit of the account, both attorneys put in claims for compensation for their
s'ervices, together with costs incurred. The fiduciary refused to pay these claims.
It was the contention of the attorneys that these claims should be deducted from
the daughter's distributive share of the estate and paid over to them by the fiduciary.
The Court held that thuse attorneys' claims for compensation and costs did not
constitute.a lien against the daughter's distributable share, and hence were not payable by the fiduciary to the attorneys.
It will be sufficient to note at this point that a valuable security interest, by
means of which an attorney may insure payment of fees due from, as well as expenses incurred in behalf of their clients, is the attorney's lien, and that in the
instant case the attorneys failed to obtain an enforceable one.
This raises the question as to just when and under what circumstances an
attorney's claim for payment of fees due from, as well as expenses incurred in
behalf of, his client can constitute a lien upon the fund, documents or other property which he has been instrumental in creating or obtaining.
An examination of the cases seems to show that attorney's liens, in Pennsylvania fall into four categories.
Common Law Retaining Lien
The first of these categories is the Retaining Li'en which has been defined as
".... the right of an attorney-at-law to retain possession of such
documents, money or other property of his client coming into his hands
by virtue of the professional relationship, until he has been paid for
his services or until he voluntarily surrenders possession of the property,
with or without payment." 2 Thornton on Attorneys-at-Law §375, p. 970.
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The chief characteristics of this lien are first, that the documents, money or
other property comes into the hands of the attorney either in the course of the
litigation or have been placed in his custody for safekeeping and second, can be
retained, but with no right on the part of the attorney to defalcate or to sell them.
This was not always the rule in Pennsylvania. In the case of Walton v. Dickerson,
7 Pa. 376 (1847), an attorney by the name of Dickerson retained $100 as compensation and paid over the balance of a fund he had collected to his client, Walton. On a rule to show cause why he should not have turned over the fudd intact,
thL Court ordered the amount paid without deduction, On a subsequent attempt
by the attorney to collect his compensation, a defense was made that the previous
Common Pleas Court action constituted res judicata as to the claim. The Court
stated, "I am not aware of any decision of this Court that gives an attorney either
a lien on the papers of the client, or on the money he collects for his fees," but
permitted the attorney to pursue his action.
This case, however, has not been followed in Pennsylvania. In fact, it has
only been quoted on one subsequent occasion, and that in a dissenting opinion
[Osterling v. Rose, 286 Pa. 263, 272 (1926)].
Professor Brown, a leading text book writer on the subject, calis this case "a
fugitive case to the contrary" and that "it is now well settled that an attorney has
th-e right to retain possession of the securities, documents and other papers of his
client . . . for the general balance due him for his professional services." Brown
on PersonalProperty, (1936) § 115, p. 501, n. 14.
The leading case in Pennsylvania at present seems to be the case of Smyth
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 125 Pa. Super. 603, subsequently affirmed
on appeal by the Supreme Court, 326 Pa. 391, 111 A.L.R. 481, 192 A. 640,
(1937), wherein it appears that an attorney by the name of Smyth obtained a
judgment of $1500 against his client for services rendered in his professional
capacity. Smyth had in his possession a stock certificate registered in the name of
his client. It became apparent that Smyth proposed to sell this certificate in order
to satisfy his judgment for services. A judgment creditor of the client succeeded
in obtaining an injunction restraining Smyth from transferring the certificate. Several months later the injunction was dissolved, but during the period of the injunction the stock steadily declined from its original value until it was worthless.
Smyth sued on the injunction bond which was conditioned to idemnify him "for
all damages which may be sustained by reason of said injunction." The case hinged
first, on whether or not Smyth had a retaining lien upon the stock certificate and
second, if so, whether he had the right to sell the same in satisfaction of his judgment. Judge Cunningham, who rendered the opinion for the Court, stated that:
"No Pennsylvania cases have been brought to our attention dealing
directly with the technical 'retaining' lien. However, our cases, relating
mostly to some phase of a charging lien or right of defalcation, as it is
designated, show, by their broad-language that an attorney has a common
law retaining lien in this State."
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[For the broad language alluded to, s'ee Dubois's Appeal, 38 Pa.
231 (1861); McKelvy's Appeal, 108 Pa. 619 (1885); Zinsser v.
Zinsser, 83 Pa. Super. 461 (1924)].
In granting judgment in favor of tht defendant, the Court made the significant statement that
"The plaintiff failed to show he sustained damage as the direct
and proximate result of the issuing of the injunction.... Granting that
the plaintiff had a common law attorney's retaining lien, it was simply
a right to hold onto the certificate and gave him no power of sale."
In 1940 the question was presented before the Supreme Court [Greek Catholic Union v. Russin, 340 Pa. 295, 17 A.2d 402 (1940) ] as to whether tht
attorney's retaining lien was restricted to cover only costs and fees in the particular
case in which the money or property was received. The lower court had so held.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and even went so far as to say that
the common law retaining lien was a general lien and therefore encompassed
costs and fees of the particular case as well as those arising from other professional
business. This is the furtherest development of the Pennsylvania law relating to
I
the common law retaining lien.
An additional problem relating to the common law attorney's retaining lien
has currently received attention from the New York and Nevada Courts which has
never been directly passed upon by a court in Pennsylvania. The problem is as
follows: 'Under what circumstances and in what manner may a court, in ordering
a substitution of attorneys, order that the documents in the displaced attorney's
hands be delivered to the substituted attorney so that the main litigation may
proceed but with due regard to the protection of the rights of the displaced
attorney where his fees have not been paid or determined? The Supreme Court
of Nevada held that it may require that documents and papers in the attorney's
hands upon which they claim a retaining lien be delivered to the clients only upon
the condition that they give security for payment of such fees as may be awarded
the displaced attorneys. Morse v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 195 P.2d 199, 3 A.L.R.2d
(1948).
136; -Nev.The New York Court has followed the same doctrine but only in "particularly
hard and meritorious" cases. Robinson v. Rogers, 237 N.Y. 467, 143 N.E. 647, 33
A.L.R. 1291 (1924); Matter of MaKames, 238 App. Div. 534, 265 N.Y. Supp.
515, 148 Misc. 759, 265 N.Y. Supp. 511 (1933).
Pennsylvania Charging Lien or Right of Defalcation
The second of these categories is what Pennsylvania has denominated as a
charging lien or right of defalcation. It can be defined as the right of an attorney
to apply against a fund in his possession belonging to his client, claims for payment of fees due from as well as expenses incurred in behalf of the client, but said
fees and expenses are restricted to those incurred in the creation of the fund. The
chief characteristics of this so called lien are first, that the fund must be in the
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possession of the attorney; second, that there is the right of defalcation which, however, is restricted to the fees and costs incurred in the creation of the fund. Note
that it is not a right of general defalcation for all fees and costs that may be due
and owing by the client to the attorney.
In an early Pennsylvania case, Balsbaugh v. Frazer, 19 Pa. 95 (1852), an
action was brought against an attorney to recover certain monies collected by the
attorney on behalf of the plaintiff. It appeared that the attorney had deducted
from the amount he had paid his client, a sum which he claimed as compensation
for his services. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court,
stating that an attorney who has money in his hands which he has recovered for
his client may deduct his fees from the amount, and payment of the balance is all
that can be lawfully demanded by the client. The Court set forth as their reason
for so holding that the
"Law of Pennsylvania permits an attorney to recover from those
who employ him in his professional capacity whatever his services are
reasonably worth. . . . A claim for such services, like any other which
arises out of a bargain or contract, express or implied, may be defalked
against on adverse demand . . ." (19 Pa. 95, 98-99)
The above case was followed by Martin v. Throckmorton, 15 Pa. Super. 632
(1901), which more clearly emphasized the narrow field of application for Pennsylvania's charging lien or right of defalcation. The attorney in that case had collected a
fund for his client in a partition proceedings and was then summoned as a garnishee
in a suit against his client. The garnishee (attorney) made a claim for counsel
fees in the partition and for services as counsel for the defendant in her capacity
as a guardian, in a distinct and independent proceeding. The Court held the attorney could not claim out of the fund in his hands for services in other proceedings
than that out of which the money came unless he can show that his client expressly so agreed.
National Slovak Society v. Gunther, 36 D. & C. 97 (1939), is an interesting
lower court case which sets forth the distinction between the retaining lien and the
charging lien in Pennsylvania. In this case the petitioner employed an attorney to
collect a claim in his behalf. The attorney and the petitioner agreed that the
former should have a $350 fee. The attorney collected the claim and retained the
monies, claiming that the petitioner owed him a sum in excess of that collected
for legal services rendered on entirely different matters. A rule was granted to
show cause why the attorney should not pay to the petitioner the monies collected
by him less the $350 agreed upon. On argument, the Court held that an attorney
has no right under the law of Pennsylvania to retain money of his client for fees
alleged to be due in cases other than the one in which the money was obtained.
In making a distinction between the two liens, the Court employed the following language:
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"The petitioner (client) concedes that in many jurisdictions an attorney's retaining lien, as opposed to a charging lien, is good for any
general balance due the attorney from the client, whether arising by
virtue of the particular case, or by virtue of other cases in which fees are
due. (97 A.L.R. 1134.) Petitioner maintains, however, that Pennsylvania has never recognized such a lien and that in Pennsylvania there is
no distinction between the retaining lien and the charging lien ....
"A retaining lien is a lien depending upon possession by the attorney and binds only money, papers or other property in his hands which
he was instrumental in collecting. . . . 'However, our cases, relating
mostly to some phase of a charging lien or right of defalcation, as it
is designated, show by their broad language that an attorney has a common low retaining lien in this State'." Smyth v. Fidelity & Deposit
pany of Maryland, supra.
Judge Keller states by way of clarification in Zinsser v. Zinsser, 83 Pa.
Super. 461, 463:
"On the other hand it has been repeatedly held by our Appellate
Courts that the lien which an attorney has for his services attaches only
to a fund, or papers, actually in his possession, McKelveys Appeal, 108
Pa. 615, and this so called lien upon funds in his possession is rather in
the nature of a right to defalcate. Dubois's Appeal, 38 Pa. 231."
In spite of Judge Keller's opinion, it does not seem clear under the Pennsylvania decisions whether an attorney can exercise his right of retaining lien for
his general balance (as it seems clear if he elects to exercise his right of defalcation he loses his right of lien for any charges other than those incurred in the
litigation which resulted in the creating of the fund) if the fund consists only of
money.
The Common Law ChargingLien
The third of these categories is the common law charging lien which has
been defined as:
"A lien on the judgment secured by the attorney in behalf of his
client for the costs, disbursements and services rendered by the attorney
in securing the same." Brown on PersonalProperty § 115, p. 500-1.
The chief characteristics of this lien are first, that the attorney must be instrumental in obtaining the judgment for his client; second, that the lien can only
be for costs, disbursements and services of the litigation which resulted in the
obtaining of the judgment; and third, that the funds are in the hands of someone
other than the attorney or the court. This lien has never been recognized in Pennsylvania.
This first becomes evident in the case of Dubois's Appeal, 38 Pa. 231 (1861),
wherein an attorney by the name of Dubois, in behalf of a firm consisting of three
partners, brought suit and recovered a judgment against their debtor. A writ of
fi. fa. was issued and the interest of the debtor in a tract of land owned by his
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wife was levied on and condemned. By various transfers of the title to the land,
Dubois obtained an interest therein. When the land was sold, Dubois claimed a
fee of $50 as compensation for obtaining the judgment, in addition to his interest
out of the proceeds for distribution. The Court held that:
"In a certain sense, an attorney has been said to have a lien for his
fees, upon the money or papers of his client, while they are in his hands.
He may deduct from money collected by him, a just compensation for
collecting it, and need only pay over the balance. This, however, is a
right to defalcate, rather than a lien. So he may retain papers entrusted
to him until he has been paid for services rendered in regard to them.
But possession is indispensabl- to his lien as much as it is to the lien of
the ordinary factor or bailee. It has never been determined that he can
maintain a claim upon a fund in court, against a mortgagee or a judgment creditor, even though such mortgagee or creditor be his own client."
In Patrick v. Bingaman, 2 Pa. Super. 113 (1896), (although reversed on
other issues in 165 Pa. 526) we find the following language:
"It is true that in equity a chancellor has the power to direct the
payment of reasonable counsel fees out of monies for distribution, when
the fund is the product of the attorney's labors and he has agreed to look
to it solely for his compensation. McKelvey's Appeal . . But there is no
warrant for the proposition that at law an attorney's claim for services,
for a sum not judicially ascertained nor assented to by other claimants,
is a lien upon the fund attached as against such claimants. To hold that
an attorney's fee is a lien on the money in court because it was recovered
through his services would be to ignore the doctrine of Dubois's Appeal.
...However desirable it may be to allow claims of counsel for services
out of funds which those services secured, it cannot be done in the
absence of legislation permitting it, to the prejudice of other creditors
who have liens upon the monies.
Following the above suggestion of the Supreme Court, a statute was enacted
(Act of May 6, 1915, P.L. 261) which attempted to give to attorneys the common
law right of a charging lien which had not heretofore been extended to them.
In said statute it was provided:
"That from the commencement of an action or proceeding, either at
law, in equity, or otherwise howsoever, or the filing of any counterclaim
or any pleading, the attorney who appears of record for a party therein
shall have a lien for his compensation for his services upon his client's
cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which shall attach to any award,
order, report, decision, compromise, settlement, verdict or judgment in
the client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may
come; and the said lien shall not be affected or defeated by any compromise or settlement between tht parties before or after judgment."
This act was declared unconstitutional in the case of La Placca v. P.R.T. Co.,
265 Pa. 304, 108 A. 612 (1919), the court declaring that it was special legislation
in view of the fact that the Act gave attorneys of record in legal proceedings a
right of lien not heretofore available to them, considering them merely as a part
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of a professional class, so violating Art. III, section 7 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania forbidding the passage of any local or special law authorizing "the creation, extension or impairing of liens ... or providing or changing methods for
the collection of debts."
In the case of Zinsser v. Zinsser, 83 Pa. Super. 461 (1924), already mentioned
while discussing the Pennsylvania right of defalcation, an attorney by the name
of Thompson obtained a judgment against one H. Zinsser on behalf of his client,
W. Zinsser, in the common law action of assumpsit. Thompson had orally agreed
with his client that he was to receive a fifty per cent contingent fee. Upon obtaining the judgment, Thompson filed an order to mark fifty per cent thereof to his
use. In the meanwhile, the two Zinssers compromised their differences and settled
the case without Thompson's knowledge. The client secured a rule to have the
order marking fifty per cent of the judgment to use of his attorney stricken from
the record. In sustaining the rule the court held that:
"An attorney may claim his fees as a preference out of money raised
by his services when it has come within the grasp of the court, applies
only to a Court of Equity, or to a proceeding in the Orphans' Court. It
does not apply to a common law action....'
In a recent decision in a lower court, HarrisburgTrust Company v. Snyder,
60 D. & C. 503, 507 (1947), Reese, P.J. reiterated the doctrine set forth in the
Zinsser case.
The Equitable Charging Lien
The fourth of these categories is the equitable charging lien or equitable allowance, which has been defined as the right of any attorney ". . . . to compensation out of a fund which has been brought into a Court of Equity by his aid and to
which it is agreed he will look for payment .. " 2 Thornton on Attorneys-atLaw, § 624. The chief characteristics of this lien are first, that the fund must
have been raised as a result of litigation in a Court of Equity; second, that the fund
must be within "the grasp of the court"; and third, that the lien can only be for
th costs, fees and disbursements of the attorney incurred in the litigation by
which the fund was raised.
The early cases do not call this instrumentality a lien but they recognize its
close proximity to one. This is illustrated in Aycinena v. Peries, 6 W. & S. 243
(1843), 2 Pa. 286 (1845), which was an action for money had and received in
the nature of a bill in chancery. The commissioners under the Spanish Treaty of
1815 awarded a large sum of money to be paid to one Yard for the loss sustained
by two vessels under order of the Spanish authorities and the sale of their cargoes.
The plaintiff, an attorney, was held to have had constructive possession of the
fund and an equitable lien on it, from his having been the efficient person by
whose means the money was ultimately recovered and having parted with the
documents at the request and for the convenience of the parties interested. Rogers,
J.:
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"This case does not come, as may be safely admitted, within the
general principle of lien; for a lien is defined to be a right in one man
to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another until certain
demands of him, the person in possession, are satisfied. Goods subject
to a lien are in the nature of a pledge, which being personal, cannot be
transferred; so if the goods are parted with, the lien, in general, is lost.
But this rule is subject to qualification . . . There are equitable exceptions to the general rule. . . .The plaintiff had possession of all the
documents on which the claim was founded, and, for the convenience of
all the parties, he parted with them. It would therefore be unjust that
by this act he should be deprived of the lien which he unquestionably
would have had if the money had come into his hands. It may then be
viewed as a qualification of the general rule applicable to liens ... "
"They all viewed the proceeds, the fruit of the services rendered
by the plaintiff, as the primary fund for the liquidation of his claim.
"Although it may not strictly be a lien, may it not be viewed as a
right or charge upon the thing itself? Thus there are liens recognized in
equity whose existence is not known or admitted at law. Gladstone v. Birley (2 Meriv. 403). In regard to these liens, it is true, it may be generally
stated that they arise from constructive trusts; they are, therefore, wholly
independent of the possession of the thing to which they are attached
as a charge or encumbrance; and they can be enforced only in a Court
of Equity .. " (6W. & S. 243, 251-2).
McKelvy's & Sterrett's Appeals, 108 Pa. 615 (1885), is an important case
falling within this category. The controversy arises out of an award to one Sterrett
and others under a Master's report. (The Master was appointed under a decree
of a Court of Equity.) Sterrett, et al., made efforts to take the fund out of court.
One Neill, an attorney, retained by Sterrett in the proceedings, moved to have
Sterrett's share impounded for his fees and submitted an application to have an
auditor appointed to fix the amount of his fees. Auditor awarded Neill $800.
Auditor found, (1) appellee was to look to the fund (Sterrett's share) for his
compensation. (2) Its existence is due in a great measure to his professional services. Held, in respect to the appellants' exception, that an attorney has no
lien on a fund in court, where the attorney was to look to the fund in court
and the existence of that fund was due in a great measure to his professional
services. In a case in a Court of Equity, though his interest is not strictly in the
nature of a lien, he is the equitable owner thereof to the extent of the value of
his services.
In 1887 several cases arose which gave voice to the equitable charging lien.
Spencer's Appeal, -Pa.-, 9 A. 523 (Pa.). In this case the Orphans' Court refused to grant an order on the Clerk of the Court to pay over certain money to
appellant. One Olds, an attorney, had been employed by the appellant to attend
to his interest in an estate, which he did. The appellant sought to evade payment
of attorney's fee. Held, an attorney at law employed to attend to the business
which produced a fund in court, who renders considerable and valuable services
and brings the matter to a successful conclusion, is entitled to compensation for
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his services out of the fund. In Appeal of Atkinson, -Pa.-, 11 A. 239, one attorney was employed to collect a judgment for its corporate client. After long and
tedious litigation, he was successful. An auditor was appointed to distribute the
money raised by execution and paid into court. The attorney not having been
paid, requested an award out of the money in court.
Held by lower court and affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court,
"Under this statement of facts the court, having control of the
funds, could not, on any principles of equity, turn all the money over
to the plaintiff and compel the attorneys to resort to a suit against an
insolvent client for the collection of his fees. McKelvy's Appeal, supra,
makes clear the duty of tht court in such a case."
The third case decided in 1887 on this issue was Appeal of Price & Townsend, 116 Pa. 410. Price & Townsend, attorneys, were employed by one Scott,
guardian for his three sons to recover in ejectment, real estate in Philadelphia,
and they were successful. The attorneys were paid in part for their services and
now claim $700 more from the estate of each minor. The eldest minor came of
age and a final account in his estate was filed by the guardian. The attorneys presented a claim against it in the Orphans' Court at the time of the adjudication of
the account. Lower court disallowed the claim, saying the Orphans' Court had
no jurisdiction to determine the claim and the claimants must pursue their remedy
at law. On appeal, decree was reversed. The court held,
"It seems to us that upon plain principles the jurisdiction to entertain claims for professional services rendered by attorneys to the estates
of minors upon contracts with their guardians, ought to reside in the
courts which have control of the accounts of guardians."
The extent and scope of this lien in equity is defined in the case of Aber's
Petition, 18 Pa. Super. 110 (1901). Aber obtained a judgment against Schnuth for
$188.42 and later Schnuth obtained judgment for $327.28 against Aber. Schnuth,
the day before the verdict was rendered in the latter case, assigned it to his attorneys, the appellees, in consideration of services rendered and money expended
by them in his behalf and other cases. Aber petitioned and was granted a rule
on Schnuth and his attorneys to show cause why Aber's judgment should not be
set off against Schnuth's. Schnuth was insolvent. Court, after a hearing, discharged the rule. The appellee argued that a set off (here one judgment against
the other) will not be permitted to the prejudice of an attorney's lien for services
rendered in obtaining the judgment, and that upon this ground the rule was
properly discharged. The court assumed, for the purposes of discussion, the attorney had an equitable claim upon the fund to be recovered. Held, in such a case
the attorney had no lien or equitable claim thereon for services rendered in other
cases.
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The leading case in this class was decided in 1936 in Harris's & Jacoby's Appeals, 323 Pa. 124, 186 A. 92 (1936), condemnation proceedings. Maxey, J.
states:
"We base our decision upon the facts that the primary right to institute and conduct the proceedings in behalf of the property, before the
board of view, was in the property's owner; that the mortgagee who
loaned money and took a first lien on this property as security therefor
was chargeable with knowledge of the fact that if the property should be
subjected to condemnation proceedings, (as it was), the right of action
for damages was in the owner and this right of action carried with it the
right to engage counsel to protect the interests of both the owner and
th'e mortgagee, whose interests in such proceedings were not antagonistic but identical; that the mortgagee knew of the employment of
Attorney Jacoby by the owner to protect the joint interests of the owner
and the mortgagee in these condemnation proceedings and apparently
approved of his employment and of what he did professionally in the
matter; and that the professional efforts of this attorney produced, to
a substantial extent, the fund for distribution, to which fund the attorney
was required, under his agreement with his record client, to look for compensation, and against which the attorney had, under circumstances here
present, an equitable claim which has often received judicial recognition
under the name of a "charging lien."
Turtle Creek Bank &Trust Co. v. Murdock, 150 Pa. Super. 277, 28 A.2d
320 (1942), affirms the McKelvy and Harris cases, supra. In this case the court
states
"Before a charging lien is recognized, it must appear (1) that the
attorney's s'ervices contributed primarily to creating the fund; and (2)
that there was an agreement with the client that the compensation was to
be paid from that fund."
In Anderson's Estate, 51 D. & C. 212 (1944), Hunter, J. states:
"Ordinarily the Orphans' Court has no jurisdiction to determine
fees between a distributee and his attorney. .

.

. An exception is made

where the attorney holds an assignment of his client's interest, in which
case the Orphans' Court had jurisdiction ...
"In the case before us there was no assignment by the distributee to
the attorney, and the Auditing Judge found expressly that there was no
agreement between them that the attorney would look to the fund for
compensation. For this reason the Auditing Judge rejected the attorney's
claim to a lien on the fund and declined to take jurisdiction of the controversy."
Judge Hunter then quotes from the Turtle Creek Bank case, supra, and sets
out in his opinion the two requirements for an attorney's equitable charging lien
as quoted in that case. He then states that the lien fails among other things because
there was no agreement that the attorney should look to the fund for his compensation. This case clarifies Orphans' Court practice on the subject of the attorney's equitable charging lien.
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Summary
In view of the above analysis of attorney's liens in Pennsylvania, it would
appear that in the Purman case, mentioned in the introduction, there is no right
of, (1) a common law retaining lien because of the fact that the present distributive share was at no time in the possession of either of the attorneys; (2) that
there is no charging lien or right of defalcation also because the fund was not in
the possession of the two attorneys; (3) there was no common law charging lien
as this type of lien is not recognized in Pennsylvania, and (4) there was no equitable charging lien, for although it had been agreed they would look to the fund
for compensation, nevertheless, the attorneys did not aid in the procurement of
the fund, nor did they successfully defend the estate from depletion because of
unjust claims.
As the services of these attorneys were professional services for which their
client is clearly indebted to them they must look solely to her for their compensation.
It is apparent that there are available to attorneys in Pennsylvania, three types
of liens.
The common law retaining lien was given recognition for the first time in
the Smyth case, supra. The lien, as outlined in this case, is upon documents which
have come into custody of the attorney through his professional relationship with
his client, and is exercisable for a general fund due the attorney from his client.
This lien is quite valuable, but hinges on the important item of possession and,
therefore, is unavailable for a fund produced by the attorney that is within the
"grasp" of the court.
Th Pennsylvania charging lien or right of defalcation is also dependent
upon the attorney's possession of a fund of money. It permits an attorney to set
off against this fund in his possession the expenses and compensation due him
which were incurred in the creation of the fund. The difficulty with this lien is
the restricted nature of the set off, viz., to only those expenses in creating the fund.
This difficulty might be dispelled to an extent by using the ietaining lien
with respect to money. The common law definition of the retaining lien includes
the money of the client in the attorney's possession. A hypothetical'case will serve
to illustrate a suggested method whereby a lien upon money in the attorney's
possession, acquired by the attorney through his professional relationship with his
client, may be used to aid recovery by said attorney of the general balance due
him from his client.
A, an attorney, in 1947, earned a $1,000 fee in the prosecution of a common
law action. In 1948, A earned another $1,000 fee from the same client in the
prosecution of a different common law action. In that latter case, the attorney
collected $3,000 for his client. All the Pennsylvania cases on this subject have
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allowed the attorney to withhold only $1,000 and pay his client the balance of
$2,000. It is submitted that he should be able to hold the entire $3,000, stating
the money belonged to his client but that he is asserting a retaining lien upon it
for the general balance of $2,000 which was due him.
The common law charging lien concerns a fund which the attorney has been
instrumental in securing for his client. The subject matter of the lien, however,
must be within "the grasp of the court" because its exercise depends upon the
fact that the court has control over the fund and also has control over its servants,
namely, attorneys. The lien, available only for the compensation and expenses in
raising the particular fund in court, has never been law in Pennsylvania. The historical reason in Pennsylvania for its non-availability has consistently been that
an attorney should not be permitted to assert his lien out of funds his services
secured to the prejudice of other creditors who have liens upon it. The legislature
attempted to give the attorney what the Pennsylvania common law never allowed

him. The La Placcacase, supra, declared the statutory charging lien unconstitutional
for the reason that attorneys are a part of a professional class and special legislation for such a group is repugnant to the Constitution.
The Pennsylvania equity decisions have permitted the equivalent of a charging lien to be exercised in equitable actions in their desire to adjust differences

where, through technicalities, the law is deficient. The similarity of this device
to the common law charging lien will not demand further discussion of its char-

acteristics. It will suffice to say that Justice Maxey has sufficiently set them out
in Harris'sAppeals, supra.
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